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Abstract: Literature is studied in different ways and at different levels: as works, namely the productions 
of geniuses, or in Heidegger’s sense of made things, which at the same time share with natural things the 
sense of being by themselves and self-sufficient; literary works are also studied as part of cultural 
phenomena and part or even the expression of a cultural tradition. In certain historical reconstructions, 
they may also be discussed as milestones and representative portrayals of the ethos and sensibility of a 
period. Their study as things making up a class of phenomena which can be compared among themselves 
is another level which, like the approaches focusing on the work as a self-sufficient entity, calls for specific 
kinds of expertise. Originality as an artistic requirement may lead in the study of literature to emphasis on 
the unique and distinctive features, which are easily identified at the surface level, whereas comparative 
studies are in real terms a challenge to explore literary phenomena in depth for shared core values. In this 
paper, these shared values are sought in the poetic image, found to be involved in the identity of literary 
works qua poetry, and serve as a basis of comparative literary studies. 
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Introduction 
Meaning is a theme of central importance in all theories of literature. In what Paul Ricoeur 
calls ‘naïve semantics’ of the text, it is both decidable and easily recovered at the textual 
surface. Hence some speak of it as a message which the work is supposed to convey; others 
as the intention which exercises the author and provided the impetus to write. In 
mythological analysis, on the other hand, ‘depth semantics’ is already taking place and 
meaning is discussed at a level where it is often not immediately utilizable. 
Poststructuralist readings, for their part, are exercised by meaning as a problem and the 
question of meaning is often found in the very conceptualisation of literature by such 
leading poststructuralist thinkers as Foucault, Derrida, and Paul Ricoeur. That question 
is really what is at stake in Foucault’s account, where literature is said to have nothing ‘to 
do but to curve back in a perpetual return upon itself, as if its discourse could have no 
other content than the expression of its own form’ (2001: 326). In Derrida’s Writing and 
Difference, it is explicitly stated that literature ‘is meaning rethought as form’ (4). It is clear 
here also that this activity of rethinking meaning as form is a process that never becomes 
completed and finalized; hence it is part of what Ricoeur calls ‘tradition’, which exists to 
be transmitted and to be interpreted in being transmitted (1974: 17). The pursuit of 
meaning in literature may therefore be in terms of practical criticism of the individual 
work; it may be in terms of a historical reflection on literature, that is a diachronic study 
of the career of meaning; and it may take place as comparative literary studies, which is 
the synchronic dimension. In this paper, I will argue that there are identical meanings 
which are found in different traditions of literature and may be thought to circulate 
within world literature. These are some of the things that make comparative literature 
possible. I shall also argue that these shared meanings go back a long way and have 
changed in some ways in the process of evolution and transmission. 
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‘Meaning Rethought as Form’ 
Myth criticism provides us with identifiable patterns of significance which recur in 
various forms throughout human cultural traditions. There are frequently occurring ones 
like crime and punishment, quest sequence, the knowledge seeker, the year god, the 
rough beast, mistaken identities, and the pharmakos. I will consider one that does not occur 
very frequently, the red dragon, which is in fact related to the rough beast, but differing 
in having a self-defined and self-centred goal and malignancy, whereas the rough beast 
is unmotivated and amoral. These patterns may be encountered in folktales as well as in 
‘highbrow’ literature (Kettle, 1960). According to Stevens in Archetype: A Natural History 
of the Self, 
there are indeed … universally recurring symbols and motifs, and … these forms 
have been subject to the essentially biological processes of evolution (Quoted by 
Knox, 2005: 17). 
Words like symbol, myth, significance, and archetype all come under what Cassirer calls 
‘symbolic forms’. They are native to humanity and are traced to the moment in the 
evolution of consciousness when language, myth, and art form one undivided unity 
(Language and Myth 93). They travel over time under the impulse of meaning which, 
according to Jean Knox ‘implies a symbol’. Encounter with this symbol is as ‘a 
representation’ (18).  
The rough beast, the year god, the knowledge seeker, and the red dragon are 
representations which embody meanings. The red dragon, for instance, is encountered in 
the Book of Revelation 
Now a great sign appeared in heaven: a woman, robed with the sun, standing on 
the moon, and on her head a crown of twelve stars. She was pregnant, and in 
labour, crying aloud in the pangs of childbirth. Then a second sign appeared in the 
sky: there was a huge red dragon with seven heads and ten horns, and each of the 
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seven heads crowned with a coronet. Its tail swept a third of the stars from the sky 
and hurled them to the ground, and the dragon stopped in front of the woman as 
she was at the point of giving birth, so that it could eat the child as soon as it was 
born. The woman was delivered of a boy, the son who was to rule all the nations 
with an iron sceptre, and the child was taken straight up to God and to his throne, 
while the woman escaped into the desert, where God had prepared a place for her 
to be looked after for twelve hundred and sixty days (Rev 12.1-6). 
Two major and contrasting symbols are shown in the narrative: the woman clothed with 
the sun, standing on the moon, and crowned with twelve stars and the ‘second sign’, the 
‘huge red dragon with seven heads and ten horns, and each of the seven heads crowned 
with a coronet’. The woman is a huge cosmic image and causes the heavenly luminaries 
to configure around her, while the huge red dragon is creating disorder, dissent, and 
division, sweeping a third of the stars of heaven with his tail and hurling them to the 
ground. Another major presence is God. But he is without ‘representation’. This entity is 
what the philosophers call being itself: fullness.  
God exercises a will with respect to the government of the nations, and the new 
born is the one designated to bring this to fulfilment. So the child is a bearer of meaning, 
the one ‘who was to rule all the nations’. His mission has been assigned in an explicit way; 
the instrument by which this mission is assigned is recoverable somewhere; and one who 
has read this narrative, encountering that instrument (again), will not fail to make the 
connection that this is he – which recalls a Johannine passage: ‘When you have lifted up 
the Son of man, then you will know that I am He’ (Jn 8.28). His identity is given 
somewhere else. To know him is to be able to match the individual here and now with 
what is given elsewhere. In short, there is something of sumbolon about him, that is, – 
‘each of two halves or corresponding pieces of [some] object which two … contracting 
parties, broke between them, each party keeping one piece, in order to have proof of the 
identity’ (The Greek-English Lexicon 1676). This child stands for something, in contrast to 
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God who does not stand for anything, but is himself, and subject of intentions. What the 
child stands for includes openness to the doing of the will of God. And he is linked to the 
woman not only in being her offspring, but also in their common alignment to the doing 
of the will of God. 
Similarly, the red dragon stands for something: opposition to the will of God. So 
determined he is to oppose the doing of the will of God that he would eat and destroy 
the child who was going to do it. So the dragon is also symbolic and the meanings held 
together in this symbol include opposition to the will of God, blind hate, cruel 
destructiveness, and pitilessness, and unthinking readiness to destroy anything and 
everything on its path to the achieving of an aim.  
The red dragon is seen elsewhere in the Bible, though without that name. The 
Herod of Matthew’s Infancy Narrative is certainly a human being, but by his behaviour 
turns out to match the red dragon as a sumbolon. We read that, 
Herod was furious on realizing that he had been fooled by the wise men, and in 
Bethlehem and its surrounding district he had all the male children killed who 
were two years old or less, reckoning by the date he had been careful to ask the 
wise men (Mt 2:16). 
In the massacre of male children of Bethlehem and the surrounding district in his pursuit 
of one little child who he has already ascertained to be the Messiah, Herod matches the 
red dragon. But some of the meanings of the red dragon symbol have become more 
clearly manifest in him: the murderous hate born of envy and fear, the vengefulness, the 
suspiciousness, the ruthlessness, and cunning. The features are so pronounced in him 
that his name could equally serve as the name of the symbol. His name could displace, 
or as Derrida says, become representation in the sense of ‘what takes the place of, what 
occupies the place of, another’ (1973: 49).  
In both of these biblical encounters with the red dragon, representation is by 
narration and transmission is as part of religious scriptures. But the meanings rethought 
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and enriched in the rethinking are available as a sumbolon, that is, one of a matching pair 
of objects, for use in characterising other figures and understanding other situations. 
Nero in Seneca’s Octavia is an example of the red dragon figure. This can be seen in the 
stichomythic dialogue with Seneca following his arbitrary order to execute two perceived 
enemies, Plautus and Sulla: 
SENECA:  Fear thou the more, that so great power is thine. 
NERO:   My fortune doth allow all things to me. 
SENECA:  Indulgent fortune trust more cautiously; she is a fickle goddess.  
NERO:   'Tis a dullard's part not to know what he may do. 
SENECA:  'Tis praiseworthy to do, not what one may, but what one ought.  
NERO:   Him who lies down the crowd trample on. 
SENECA:    Him whom they hate, they crush. 
NERO:   The sword protects the Prince, 
SENECA:    Still better, loyalty. 
NERO:   A Caesar should be feared. 
SENECA:    But more be loved. 
NERO:   But men must fear 
SENECA:    What is compelled is burdensome. 
NERO:   Let them obey our orders. 
SENECA:    Give righteous orders — 
NERO:   I shall myself decide. 
SENECA:    which the general thought may ratify. 
NERO:   Reverence for the sword will ratify them (450-461). 
Nero is driven by his desires and wishes. He recognizes no external constraint of any 
kind. Action is based on what he may permit himself to do, whether or not he has the 
means to do it, and the force to withstand opposition and compel obedience. This attitude 
was to give rise to what was known as the Reign of Terror under the French Revolution, 
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although the leaders of this revolution were presumably pursuing a certain conception 
of social order and political culture based on principles outside themselves. This is why 
to this day some social thinkers continue to pay court to the ‘ideal’ of the French 
Revolution. Nero, however, sees his own desires and wishes as supreme reality.  In the 
above he displays great arrogance, but also unveils another dimension of meaning in the 
symbolism of the red dragon, namely that underlying his arrogant abuse of power and 
murderous egotism is fear: ‘Him who lies down the crowd trample on’. It is in fact 
Seneca’s use of the ‘ought sentence … the primary linguistic form in which morality finds 
expression’ (Habermas, 1994: 40), that causes him to lose his cool. The whole idea of a 
morality which might be binding upon him is intolerable to him. 
Like all figures of the red dragon, Nero will override and trample anything and 
everything in the bid to attain his aim. Nothing matters to him; nothing has value, except 
the object he has in view, whatever this may be. He is the centre of his own universe and 
wants everything else to circulate around himself. In vain Seneca tries to get him to factor 
into his thinking the unknown: whether he can attain his aim; whether he can keep it in 
his control when attained, and for how long. 
There is no evidence of knowledge of the biblical tradition of the red dragon in 
Seneca’s Octavia. In point of fact, the meanings associated with that symbol do not 
originate in the Bible, nor is it a question of meanings evolving independently in another 
culture. There is rather a common origin in the moment of emergence of consciousness. 
But the meanings continue to be rethought, and we are seeing further dimensions of them 
in representation of Nero/the red dragon in Octavia. The ‘red dragon’ is of course a 
biblical figure. It has become a sign freighted with meaning, not in I. A. Richards’s sense 
of a ‘vehicle’, but rather in Derrida’s sense of ‘the charged signifier’ (Of Grammatology 286), 
‘charged with history’ (289), and ‘with making pass, from one subject to another, the identity 
of a signified object, of a meaning or of a concept rightfully separable from the process of 
passage and from the signifying operation’ (Positions 23). We are dealing with meanings 
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which pre-exist the moment of configuration with a name. And ‘Herod’ or ‘Nero’ may 
equally serve as the name, being a ‘substantial embodiment’ (Cassirer) of the old 
meanings with their new elaborations. These are storied names and they do indeed 
become bywords in the different traditions and cultures where they are encountered 
because, as Cassirer has shown, 
There is nothing beside or beyond it whereby it could be measured or to which it 
could be compared; its mere presence is the sum of all Being. At this point, the 
word which denotes that thought content is not a mere conventional symbol, but 
is merged with its object in an indissoluble unity. The conscious experience is not 
merely wedded to the word, but is consumed by it. Whatever has been fixed by a 
name, henceforth is not only real, but is Reality. The potential between "symbol" 
and "meaning" is resolved; in place of a more or less adequate "expression", we 
find a relation of identity, of complete congruence between "image" and "object," 
between the name and the thing (Language and Myth 58) 
In the history of symbolic forms, there are human names that have been used for symbols 
and become ‘consumed’ by the meanings in question, such as Oedipus, Prometheus, 
Adam, and Faustus. These great symbols have tended to be transmitted in tragic 
sequences. Some like the red dragon seem to be amenable to both tragic sequences as in 
the Herod narrative and Octavia, as well as in the comic, as in the apocalyptic narrative. 
These are some of the modes in which literature may be encountered in any tradition of 
literature. 
Biblical poetry, where some of the best known examples of apocalyptic literature 
are found, makes up one tradition of poetry. It is part of world literature precisely because 
of the recognizable meanings which link it to other poetic traditions. Czeslaw Milosz’s 
imagery in which the poet has a participatory role ‘in the management of the estate of 
poetry, [] that in his own language and also that of world poetry’ (The Book of Luminous 
Things xv) will be trivial if understood in terms of helping to maintain by adding to the 
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archives in question. It says a great deal more if the meanings being transmitted in each 
traditions are human meanings, belonging to humanity, possession and the capability to 
process which are essential in what it means to be human. The rethinking the meaning in 
an individual poem, is at the same time its being rethought by the tradition and by 
humanity in its shared poetic forms. 
The patterning of thought in dramatic form, for instance, opens up certain 
possibilities. The participant in a dialogue may receive information and be persuaded; 
there may be genuine communicative action in which the participants ‘arrive rationally 
at agreement about goals and purposes’ (Habermas 1971: 316); it can also fail to bring 
about intersubjectivity. In the above dialogue, Seneca’s self-engagement to persuade and 
bring about a change of attitude on the part of Nero fails. The dialogue soon overheats 
from full lines to half-lines, Nero the first to become impatient and short, with his Calcat 
iacentem vulgus (‘Him who lies down the crowd trample on’). His violent nature is 
reflected here, as well as unwillingness to consider any viewpoint but his own. So the 
dialogue is doomed from the beginning. 
Art is of course a chief method of transmission of the symbol, the archetypal 
meanings which according to Derrida, literature ceaselessly rethinks – not in a rational 
mode, the way of philosophy, but within the format imposed by one form or another 
(Writing and Difference 4). For example, in Octavia, the successive moves by the 
participants in the discourse gives the impression of ‘reciprocal respect’, a requirement if 
practical discourse is to lead to a negotiated agreement, as it ‘represents a reciprocal 
pragmatic condition of participants in interaction ascribing themselves rights and duties’ 
in ‘complete reciprocity’ (Habermas, 1994: 44-45). But it is obvious that ‘arguments and 
justifications’ are ruled out as the means of reaching agreement mainly because of Nero’s 
attitude. 
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The rethinking of meaning in art is not only as it is produced by form, it already 
implicates a diachronic process. Paul Ricoeur elucidates this process under what he calls 
‘tradition’. 
Interpretation does not spring from nowhere; rather, one interprets in order to 
make explicit, to extend, and so to keep alive the tradition itself, inside which one 
always remains. It is in this sense that the time of interpretation belongs in some 
way to the time of tradition. But tradition in return, even understood as the 
transmission of a depositum, remains a dead tradition if it is not the continual 
interpretation of this deposit: our "heritage" is not a sealed package we pass from 
hand to hand, without ever opening, but rather a treasure from which we draw by 
the handful and which by this very act is replenished. Every tradition lives by 
grace of interpretation, and it is at this price that it continues, that is, remains living 
(1974: 27). 
There are traditions, but there is also tradition itself, and both have their histories. In each 
the content (depositum) is constantly rethought and reinterpreted; and this rethinking and 
re-interpretation is at the same time the handing on of that content. Therefore, even if we 
are dealing with, say, the same item of meaning over time, it changes somewhat in a new 
work where it is again encountered. 
 
Africa and the Two Estates 
The debate about the language of African literature was immediately succeeded by one 
on who was qualified to be a critic of African literature. Both those questions actually go 
back to Obiajunwa Wali (1961), when he demanded that African literature together with 
its criticism ought to be in African languages. The debate on the language of African 
literature did not bring about any appreciable change, because as I have shown elsewhere 
some dimensions of the question do not appear to have been opened up at all, particularly 
the aspect of the literary language, which was not ready and waiting, but needed to be 
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developed through focused, sustained, and creative effort. No doubt, the ready 
availability of English with its fully developed literary resources was a major reason why 
the effort to evolve an appropriate literary language for the vernacular was not 
undertaken. However, the use of English by the literary intellectuals had a major 
unintended consequence. The use and in fact adoption of the language of the former 
colonists was politically expedient, especially in multi-ethnic situations. But the failure of 
the leading cultural figures, the writers and critics, to contest this practice and instead 
falling in line with it was confirmation of control of the linguistic space by the languages 
of the former colonists in the newly independent countries. On the other hand, use of the 
vernacular for so significant a cultural production as literary art would not only have 
given the vernacular the basis and the means to contest domination of the linguistic space, 
it would have hampered the development of loyalty and sense of affiliation to a state 
created by an act of will of European powers as their overseas ‘possession’ and sphere of 
exclusive rights of exploitation.  
The debate was noisy and hastily conducted; it then quickly blew over. Even more 
important is that it ended on a dogmatic note, settling on a view of literature as an 
instrument with which to do certain things and effect certain changes relevant to the 
being of society. On this note, what mattered was the task assigned literature, whether to 
teach the people that they had a civilization of their own and also where and how things 
went wrong in their history (Achebe), or whether to strive to gain control of power 
metaphorically on behalf of the people and re-engineering and re-structuring society to 
become more respectful and supportive of individual freedoms and aspirations (Soyinka); 
whether the business was the undermining and dismantling of the colonial infrastructure 
(Nkosi), protesting or leading protest against colonialism and neo-colonialism, 
imperialism, racism, and abuse of power, or following Arnold’s notion of ‘criticism of 
life’, attempting to correct unenlightened ways, or following Sartre’s theory of 
‘engagement’, taking action to sniff out and expose imposture, corruption, and 
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malpractice and advocating ways to root out these – which was very common among the 
writers during the 1970s and 1980s. African writing may certainly be said never to have 
shied away from what Said calls ‘the major social and economic outside facts of their 
existence – colonialism and imperialism’; and it has been fully supported in this by the 
critics. For some of the kinds of purposes assigned literature, the new-acquired language 
was probably considered more handy and more effective, since the target audience was 
potentially unlimited. Phanuel Egejuru has in fact concluded that the real audience of 
African literature was outside Africa; hence none of the vernaculars could have been 
appropriate. Although there have been a few attempts to produce African language 
literature, modern African literature has continued to be dominantly in the languages of 
the former colonists. Some of the younger writers in Nigeria, for example, are people who 
have grown up in middle-class households where the idea in child upbringing was to 
give the children a head start in formal education by training them to speak English 
exclusively from the time they began to utter their first words. This practice, even if they 
went on later to learn their mother tongues, would have so distanced them from the 
idiomatic forms and other poetically relevant resources that the possibility of an authentic 
vernacular language literature would indeed be remote. 
The question put about the language of criticism was veered away into the 
qualifications of the critic of African literature, and while the language qualification was 
dropped following the trend in the creative department, criticism restricted itself largely 
to African – or perhaps Black – literature. The qualification of the critic was understood 
in terms of the affirmative/activist orientation which had been imposed on the literature. 
As a result, little effort was made to relate modern African literature to world literature. 
But since ‘reading is comparing’ (Riffaterre 407), African literature has tended in the 
criticism to be referenced to the ‘social outside facts’ and placed side by side with social 
criticism as things of the same kind.  
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There is probably need to move the African literary texts ‘from a surface semantics, 
that of the narrated myth, to a depth semantics, that of the boundary situations which 
constitute the ultimate “referent” of the myth’ (Ricoeur, 1981: 217), to see the deep 
relationships they hold to other literary texts and traditions, relationships which are 
connected to their identity as literary texts. At the level of ‘naïve interpretation’, these 
texts appear to share the same concerns over social practice and national and cultural 
histories with social commentaries and histories; at the level of depth interpretation, the 
text becomes a ‘genuine object of understanding’ (218), not a pointer to something outside 
itself. The surface semantics of Wole Soyinka’s Season of Anomy, for example, has often 
been in terms of a fictionalized version of the author’s prison notes, The Man Died. The 
cartel is seen as a model for some real situation, not a mythic image; and so there is no 
question of what might be the ‘ultimate referent’ of that myth. A depth semantics of the 
mythic image, however, reveals the red dragon. In a personal way, Zaki Amuri, the ‘gross 
Cross-river quad of the Cartel’ is that red dragon. Here is a representation in which the 
mythological image is in full display: 
Zaccheus shook his head in firm rejection. ‘No man, not this time. You are 
way way off. When we get there you’ll see what I mean. Not a ghost in the streets 
Ofe. Just the flies and the vultures and the bully-boys raking every movement with 
their bullets. Aristo couldn’t move fast enough to exploit that situation.’  
‘Maybe you’re right. But they did come for her. They didn’t just come to 
raid an enemy hang-out and maybe capture a beautiful slave. They came for her 
and were ready to kill the lot of you even without your standing in the way. They 
did not want any witnesses. Look Zack, they knew she was there. Whoever 
organized it knew where to find her.’  
‘Sure they knew. Didn’t we have posters all over the place?’  
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‘Aristo had been trying to sell her to that gross Cross-river quad of the 
Cartel. I know he took the news of my last session with the Corpse to him – in 
person. By air. The trouble-shooter entrusted him with the report.’  
Zaccheus looked at him as if he now suspected his reason. ‘So you think 
Amuri set up the whole thing, shot up the town and extended it all over Cross-
river just for one dame? Look man, I know Celestial does funny things to ….’  
‘Iri was just a personal bonus. So was what was done to your band. They 
were after the men of Aiyéró everywhere. But they have to disguise it by 
unleashing death on a far wider scale’ (158-159). 
Iriyise/Celestial is a woman of extraordinary beauty, who ‘does funny things to men’. To 
get hold of her, the Zaki who up to now has exercised absolute power in Cross-river, is 
prepared to shoot up a whole town in this part of the country he runs like private 
property. But Iriyise is only a ‘personal bonus’. His aim is to reassert his absolute and 
total domination in the region, first by wiping out ‘the men of Aiyéró’ who had been 
conscientizing the people of Cross-river about their conditions of existence in which they 
have no rights whatever, their rights as human beings and citizens so routinely 
overridden by the Zaki that they see the order of things under him as normal. His aim, 
however, is through indiscriminate massacres to re-instil fear of his person among the 
Cross-river people. 
Like Nero, the Zaki uses the apparatuses of state purely for his own ends. Nothing 
means anything to him except what at any given moment he is aiming at. For the Zaki, 
however, power is not the ultimate aim. That is something he uses to secure and enhance 
the accumulation of material wealth. Religion is another tool of his under which the 
people willingly submit to a hierarchy with him at the top and the holder of all power, 
wealth, privilege, access to leisure, and right to be waited upon and deferred to, no matter 
what. This use of all socio-political institutions, including even the military government 
putatively running his country to assure for himself the best of everything available is a 
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dimension that enters into the rethinking of the red dragon in Season of Anomy and a point 
of contrast to another twentieth century sequence of the red dragon from another part of 
the world: the Russian Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag Archipelago. There is no 
suggestion in this work that the red dragon figure, Joseph Stalin, is committed to material 
acquisitions. Rather he is so obsessed with controlling power and being worshipped for 
it that he quite develops a pathological fear of losing it. The enemy to be destroyed or 
impeded for life through imprisonment and an array of strategies of exclusion is whoever 
seems to stand for the possibility of another point of view than his own. The Zaki has no 
need to disguise his interests, since he has successfully kept the people in ignorance. 
Stalin’s people are educated, but he contrives to keep them in partial ignorance through 
a complex programme of censorship, aimed at keeping out the ideas and influence of ‘the 
international bourgeoisie’. 
In The Gulag Archipelago, the red dragon at last discovers the need to justify himself. 
Clearly, a system which has come into power through a revolution could not maintain 
itself in power by the same principle on which the old regime was based, which was 
divine right. The Stalinist system wanted total power and invoked ideology as 
justification for the sacrifice of civil liberties, human rights, and citizens’ lives on a 
massive scale. We read: 
The imagination and the spiritual strength of Shakespeare's evildoers 
stopped short at a dozen corpses. Because they had no ideology.  
Ideology—that is what gives evildoing its long-sought justification and 
gives the evildoer the necessary steadfastness and determination. That is the social 
theory which helps to make his acts seem good instead of bad in his own and 
others' eyes, so that he won't hear reproaches and curses but will receive praise 
and honours. That was how the agents of the Inquisition fortified their wills: by 
invoking Christianity; the conquerors of foreign lands, by extolling the grandeur 
of their Motherland; the colonizers, by civilization; the Nazis, by race; and the 
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Jacobins (early and late), by equality, brotherhood, and the happiness of future 
generations.  
Thanks to ideology, the twentieth century was fated to experience evildoing 
on a scale calculated in the millions. This cannot be denied, nor passed over, nor 
suppressed. How, then, do we dare insist that evildoers do not exist? And who 
was it that destroyed these millions? Without evildoers there would have been no 
Archipelago (chapter 4). 
In Octavia, Nero has no need to justify himself. He is a Caesar; and that in his eyes places 
him above everyone, above every institution and norm, a view which Seneca does not 
contest. He is a Caesar: that is his ‘fortune’; and it comes with the right to do what he may. 
Being a Caesar allows all things to him. The Zaki makes a similar claim; and the people of 
Cross-river have not only been trained and intimidated into letting him have his way, 
they have learned to anticipate his wishes and to carry them out in all servility. It is his 
right to wish anything, theirs to obey. The Aiyéró migrants ‘from down south’, however, 
by suggesting that the local people do have and can lay claim to their human rights have 
become a thorn in his side.  
Stalin does not make nor can sustain claims like the Zaki’s or Nero’s. But since he 
must exercise himself as a red dragon, he needs to fortify his will – in the sense of building 
a protective wall around it. That is what the ideology enables: he sets it up as an objective 
norm guiding every aspect of life and all socio-political relationships with himself as the 
servant and defender, as well as its privileged interpreter. Just like the Zaki, Nero, and 
Herod, the public good is what he says that it is. Those who oppose him or think 
differently are not his opponents, but enemies of the commonwealth. Stalin’s ultimate 
aim, however, is more in line with Nero’s, who wants to command and dominate. 
Imperator (commander/dictator) is really what he means when he says ‘a Caesar’. What 
he demands of the people is therefore simple: ‘Let them obey our orders.’ That too is what 
Stalin wants. The ideology, the killings running to millions, the Archipelago, the abuse 
51                                                       Journal of Studies in Social Sciences 
and arbitrary denial of rights of the whole citizenry are all serving one and the same 
purpose: the entrenchment of a totalitarian system of dictatorship. 
 
Conclusion 
There is often a historical basis for sequences of the red dragon. For the purposes of a 
depth semantics of such a work, one has to bear in mind Aristotle’s contrasting of history 
and poetry, the first dealing with the particular, the second with the universal (The Poetics 
Part 9). Surface semantics connecting literature to socio-historical experience may only 
lead to poetry as comprising a multiplicity of individual and unique ‘estates’. Socio-
historical experiences occupying the textual surface frequently overlie something of 
higher value, namely the poetic image. Socio-historical experience does not create this; it 
derives from the faculty of myth-making (Freidenberg 2006). The mythological image or 
symbol is what gives this kind of literature the property of universality. The image is not 
exhausted or even properly contained in its existential representation; for it embodies 
human meanings which are not tied to time and space. Surface semantics of Season of 
Anomy limits the horizon of meaning to Nigeria, just as surface semantics of 
Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag Archipelago limits its horizon to Stalinist Russia. A depth 
semantics of their mythical images, however, bursts open these limited and limiting 
horizons. Thus do we see that The Gulag Archipelago is as much a sequence of the red 
dragon as Season of Anomy, and that a comparative study of the two is not just possible 
but a task – the very service by which criticism participates in the management of the 
estate of world literature. 
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